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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jack Kessler appeals from the district court's Judgment of Conviction and Order 
of Probation, entered upon his conditional guilty plea to one count of possession of 
methamphetamine. Mr. Kessler asserts that the district court erred in denying his 
motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his unreasonable, warrantless 
detention and search. This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State's arguments 
that Mr. Kessler's initial detention and frisk were constitutionally reasonable. Although 
the propriety of any warrantless search and seizure necessarily depends upon an 
objective review of the facts specific to the case at hand (see e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 
U.S. 491, 498 (1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981)), 
Mr. Kessler addresses the distinctions between the facts in his case and the facts 
supporting the conclusions reached in the opinions relied upon by the State in support 
of its assertions. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Kessler's Appellant's Brief. Unless necessary to address the claims raised by the 
State in its Respondent's Brief, they will not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
1 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kessler's motion to suppress as Officer 
Kauffman detained and frisked Mr. Kessler in violation of his Fourth Amendment right to 




The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kessler's Motion To Suppress As Officer 
Kauffman Detained And Frisked Mr. Kessler In Violation Of His Fourth Amendment 
Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Searches And Seizures 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Kessler asserts that the State's reliance upon State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 
930 (1992), State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180 (Ct. App. 2000), and In re Doe, 145 
Idaho 980 (Ct. App. 2008), is misplaced as the facts in those cases are distinguishable 
in relevant ways from the facts surrounding Mr. Kessler's detention and subsequent 
search. 
B. Officer Kauffman Did Not Possess A Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That 
Mr. Kessler Was Involved In The Alleged Vehicular Burglary Or Was Otherwise 
Involved In Criminal Activity At The Time She Detained Him; Thus, Mr. Kessler's 
Fourth Amendment Right To Be Free From Unreasonable Seizures Was Violated 
And The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To Suppress 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Kessler asserted that Officer Kauffman did not 
possess a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was involved in any criminal activity 
at the time of his detention; thus, his warrantless seizure violated his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. (Appellant's Brief, pp.8-13.) 
The authority and arguments Mr. Kessler relies upon need not be repeated in detail in 
this Reply Brief but are incorporated herein by reference. In response, the State relies 
upon State v. Rawlings, 121 Idaho 930 (1992), and State v. Robertson, 134 Idaho 180 
(Ct. App. 2000), in support of its claims that Mr. Kessler's seizure was not 
constitutionally infirm. (Respondent's Brief, pp.8-10.) The State's reliance upon this 
authority is misplaced. 
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In Rawlings, between 4:30 a.m. and 5:00 a.m., officers responded to a "report of 
a burglary in progress" at a stereo shop in Boise and, when the officers arrived, they 
noticed that a window was broken and at least one of the officers was concerned that a 
suspect may still have been on the premises. Rawlings at 931. At approximately 5:00 
a.m., one of the officers became aware of "a man walking across a parking lot in the 
block immediately to the west of the site of the reported burglary" and, with no other 
people visible in the area, the officer followed the individual to the parking lot of another 
nearby business and seized the person. Id. In Robertson, a police officer responded to 
an audible security alarm that had sounded at a business the officer knew had been 
burglarized and vandalized of several previous occasions. Robertson at 183. Upon 
arrival, the officer notices a lone person walking in a direction away from the business 
approximately 100 to 125 feet away from the business and the officer seized the 
individual. Id. In both cases, the appellate court found that seizures involved did not 
violate the defendant's rights to be free from unreasonable seizures. Rawlings at 932-
33, Robertson at 184-185. 
In both Rawlings and Roberston, the officers had specific information tying the 
persons seized to the burglaries that had been reported; namely, the individuals were 
seized near the site of the burglaries, near the time when the burglaries were reported 
to have occurred. Rawlings at 931, Roberlson at 183. I n contrast, Officer Kauffman 
drove to the area where multiple suspects may have fled for "containment" purposes. 
(Tr., p.37, Ls.1-12, Tr., p.38, Ls.14-19, p.40, Ls.8-13.) Officer Kauffman had an 
admittedly vague description of the suspects - "all in dark clothing. They appeared to be 
males" - and seized the first person she saw matching that vague description as she 
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arrived at her assigned post. (Tr., p.25, L.3 - p.71, L.3.) In fact, Officer Kauffman 
herself expressed nothing more than a "hunch" that Mr. Kessler was involved in the 
burglaries stating only that she "believed it was possible." (Tr., p.39, Ls.7-12.) Her 
"hunch"was, in fact, wrong. (Tr., p.113, Ls.10-13.) 
Unlike the suspects in Rawlings and Robertson whose seizures were based 
upon their proximity both in time and location to the burglaries investigated, 
Mr. Kessler's seizure was based upon Officer Kauffman's subjective belief in the 
possibility that he was involved in the burglary due to the fact that he was found in the 
area of "containment." It is reasonable to conclude that Officer Kaufman would have 
"believed it was possible" that any male wearing dark clothing in the area of 
"containment" may have been involved in the burglary and, thus, been subject to Officer 
Kauffman's detention. The Fourth Amendment, however, requires more that an officer's 
mere hunch. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 
(1983); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-18 (1981). Mr. Kessler's warrantless 
seizure was unreasonable and Rawlings and Robertson do not compel a contrary 
conclusion. 
C. Officer Kauffman Did Not Possess A Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion That 
Mr. Kessler Was Presently Dangerous At The Time She Frisked Him; Thus, 
Mr. Kessler's Fourth Amendment Right To Be Free From Unreasonable 
Searches Was Violated And The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion To 
Suppress 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Kessler additionally asserted that Officer Kauffman 
did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that he was presently dangerous at the 
time she frisked him, thus violating his Fourth Amendment right to be free from 
unreasonable searches. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-16.) The authority and arguments he 
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relies upon need not be repeated in detail in this Reply Brief but are incorporated herein 
by reference. In response, the State relies upon In re Doe, 145 Idaho 980 (Ct. App. 
2008), in support of its argument that due to the nature of the suspected crime, i.e., 
burglary, Officer Kauffman's frisk of Mr. Kessler was constitutionally valid. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp.1 0-13.) The State's reliance upon Doe is misplaced. 
In Doe, two juveniles were seen at by church employees looking into a window of 
the church at night, and appeared to possibly be attempting to gain access. Id. at 981. 
After seizing the juveniles, but prior to frisking them, "it was determined that the two 
individuals dressed in black were the ones seen by the church employee." Id. at 981-
82. In ultimately finding the frisk to be reasonable, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
"it is not unlikely" that a burglar would arm him or herself in case they were caught and, 
furthermore, a burglar may be armed with weapons or other tools that could be used as 
weapons. Id. at 982-984. 
In the present case, unlike in Doe where the seized individuals were positively 
identified as the individuals looking into the windows and possibly trying to gain access 
to the church, Officer Kauffman testified that even after she had seized Mr. Kessler and 
after he told her he had a knife, she "still was not sure that he was a viable suspect for a 
vehicular burglary." (Tr., p.49, L.12 - p.50, L.3.) The Court of Appeals' reasoning in the 
Doe opinion is inapplicable to the present case as Officer Kauffman could not 
objectively, reasonably believe that "it is not unlikely" Mr. Kauffman would be presently 
dangerous due to his status as a burglar, when Officer Kauffman was not even sure 
Mr. Kessler was a "viable suspect" for the burglary she was investigating. Mr. Kessler's 
warrantless frisk was unreasonable and Doe does not compel a contrary conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kessler respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
DATED this 31 st day of March, 2011. 
JASON C.INTLER 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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